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Comparative Heuristics from an STS Perspective. 
Inquiring “Novelty“ in Material Practice  
Julian Stubbe ∗ 
Abstract: »Komparative Heuristik aus Sicht der Wissenschafts- und Technikfor-
schung. Die Suche nach ‚Neuheit‘ in materiellen Praktiken«. This article proposes 
reconfiguring comparison as a method for innovation studies. It explores how 
two objects – a media installation and a robotic hand – are configured as novel 
through a complexity of materialities, stories, and bodies. In focus are small-
scale interactions that signify relations between technological objects and their 
stories. The methodological approach advanced in this article focuses on the 
construction of comparability, the perspective from which something is com-
pared, and one’s own bodily involvement in co-producing situations. Through 
two configurative moments, rendering imagined objects and material referenc-
ing, this article delineates how the installation and the robotic hand materialise 
imaginaries and how they articulate stories of their difference. The proposed 
reconfiguration avows novelty as a concept through which continuities can be 
drawn, just as it acknowledges the locality of its articulation in different forms. 
Its perspective is local, as it is immersed in the net of materialities, stories, and 
bodies, while it moves on and re-arranges what is understood and what needs 
to be understood. 
Keywords: Methods, comparative research, ethnography, innovation, novelty, 
materiality, media art, robotics. 
 
Reflections on the form of narration and the otherness of one’s  
subject matter are also reflections on the kinds of connections  
these concepts make possible.  
Strathern (1991, 51) 
1.  Configuring Novelty1 
The opening chapter of this HSR Special Issue reiterates a common critique on 
science and technology studies (STS) (Jungmann et al. 2015, in this HSR Spe-
cial Issue). It refers to STS’s tendency to neglect to identify patterns that appear 
                                                             
∗  Julian Stubbe, Department of Sociology, Technical University of Berlin, Sekretariat FH 9-1, 
Fraunhoferstr. 33-36, 10587 Berlin, Germany; julian.stubbe@innovation.tu-berlin.de. 
1  I would like to thank Robert Jungmann, Dzifa Ametowobla, Estrid Sørensen, Emily York, and 
Werner Rammert for their insightful and rich comments on this paper.  
HSR 40 (2015) 3  │  110 
across cases, in favour of focusing on contingencies within single cases and 
stressing the situatedness of processes. According to the critique, this focus has 
certainly brought about interesting insights for innovation studies by, for ex-
ample, implicating heterogeneous relations among humans and non-humans, 
but it hinders comparison of different innovative realms. A methodological 
impediment for comparison is STS’s paradigmatic insistence on thick descrip-
tions, which hinders formulating the abstract processes that structure practices 
in different fields of innovation. In this article, I respond to this criticism, not 
by claiming it is entirely false and unjustified, but by using heuristic resources 
from STS to reconfigure issues concerning comparison. By reconfiguring, I 
mean to stress issues concerning how comparison is done. However, instead of 
claiming that previous approaches are false and outdated, I build upon methods 
and use recent questions concerning novelty as an occasion to re-arrange issues 
and re-articulate how to compare differently in order to overcome a methodo-
logical paradox. This methodological paradox, on the one hand, accounts for 
the situatedness and performativity of discrete events, which is a trademark of 
ethnography and STS, and, on the other hand, goes beyond descriptions and 
identifies continuities and patterns across sites to foster the definition of ab-
stract processes. The consequential question for the methods of innovation 
studies is less how to make ethnographic data comparable and more how to use 
comparison to learn something about innovation or novelty, without giving up 
the specificity of its local emergence. In this article, I do not approach compari-
son by defining deductive categories and searching for their manifestation, but 
propose comparison as a method to inductively address questions related to the 
emergence of novelty – and by enhancing and using subjectivity instead of 
fighting its infiltration. In the focus of this attempt are small-scale interactions 
occurring in material practice. I approach the comparison with the research 
question: How is novelty enacted through materialities, stories, and bodies? 
The intent to stress comparison as a method for innovation studies stems 
from observations concerned with the construction of two objects. One object 
is a media installation, for the investigation of which I visited an artist’s studio 
and accompanied him during his creative process. The installation consists of 
different mechanical and electronic elements that are assembled to create a kind 
of floating movement. The movement is made visible through a laser projection 
that reacts to the contingent interaction of these elements. The other object is a 
robotic hand, which is made out of silicon. Silicon is not a common material used 
for robotic hands. Usually, robotic hands are made from solid materials that are 
electronically steered. Hence, the silicon hand’s grasping is not programmed, but 
based on compliance with an artefact’s surface. The hand is a current research 
challenge of a robotics laboratory, but is mainly engineered and researched by 
one scientist. Both objects are technically complex; that is, their engineering 
requires advanced technical knowledge and a specific material infrastructure to 
build them. Furthermore, their complexity entails opacity, which makes the 
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exact principles of their working not only hidden from the lay spectator, but to 
all actors involved. Over the course of approximately two years, I encountered 
both objects’ developments through various situations. I visited experiments in 
the studio and laboratory, followed mundane tinkering practices, recurrently 
conducted interviews, went to robotics conferences and art exhibitions, and 
analysed discursive documents such as research papers and exhibition cata-
logues. During the time of the empirical observations, which I compare in this 
paper, both objects were prototypes. The installation at the time was material-
ised as a test structure consisting of wooden plates and mechanical elements, 
and the silicon hand consisted of three rudimentary fingers and a palm, which 
could not yet be attached to a robot’s torso and arm.  
To focus my comparison and to find continuities2 in constructing the instal-
lation and the robotic hand, I draw on configurations as a heuristic. Configura-
tions address the ways in which entities are put in relation – in their semiotic as 
well as material sense. They address how a specific figure is given a particular 
form, as well as how the material figures cultural imaginations. Lucy Suchman 
characterises configuration as a “heuristic device that has two broad uses for 
the study of technoscientific objects.” First, she describes configurations as an 
aid “to delineating the composition and bounds of an object.” Delineating 
boundaries is not only a methodological approach to the study of technologies, 
but is also integral to their very existence as objects. Suchman refers to objects 
not in the sense of fixed, materialised units, but as compositions that require 
rendering to exist as entities, just as it is a methodological aim to capture and 
re-articulate them. Second, by using configurations as a heuristic, she draws 
our analytic attention to “the ways in which technologies materialise cultural 
imaginaries, just as imaginaries narrate the significance of technical artefacts” 
(Suchman 2012, 48). The rendering of objects not only entails the assemblage 
of materialities, but also imaginaries and stories that signify an object’s exist-
ence (cf. Strathern 1999). Understood in this heuristic sense, configurations 
stress studying technological objects with particular attention to the imaginaries 
and materialities that they join together. Novelty, in this regard, is not a proper-
ty or universal good, but an articulation that calls out differences to whatever is 
referenced as the thing that came before (Suchman 2011, 15). 
Accounting for configurations methodologically stresses that objects be re-
garded as enacted as distinguishable units through the temporality of interac-
tions (cf. Strathern 1991; Pickering 1995; Rammert 1999; Barad 2007). They 
are performed through the circularity of interactions that mutually constitute an 
object’s and subject’s temporal modes of existence (i.e. Myers 2008; Alač 
                                                             
2  In the remainder of this article, I speak of continuities instead of empirical patterns. These 
terms are not contradictory. I understand continuities as the more basal term and refer to it 
as elements, which are the same or similar in two or more situations and provide a connec-
tion between them.  
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2009). Distinctions as, for instance, “art object” versus “scientific object” or 
“old” versus “new” are not fixed properties, but relations (or configurations) 
that may change across and within cases. This entails not regarding the installa-
tion and the robotic hand as samples of two institutionalised units of a field. 
This is not to say that their contextualisation does not matter. On the contrary, 
it means acknowledging the variety and situatedness of relating and referencing. 
In the methodological contexts of innovation studies, this perspective is relevant a 
fortiori. If modes of innovation change because they become more “reflexive” 
(Hutter et al. 2015, in this HSR Special Issue), our methodology cannot repro-
duce positions or act upon technological objects as given and significant in their 
own right. Enactments stress considering novelty and difference to be repeti-
tively reproduced in resonance with an object’s temporal and spatial location 
within innovation processes. 
This paper makes an attempt to delineate specific moments through which 
the installation and the robotic hand are configured in their becoming. It pro-
poses comparing configurations and going beyond thick descriptions of ethno-
graphic observations. To begin this exploration, I problematize comparison as 
method and stress three issues regarding the methodological paradox men-
tioned above. Later, I pick up these issues again and re-articulate them through 
the notion of novelty informed by Marilyn Strathern’s distinctive style of ana-
logical comparison.3 For that reconfiguration, I further draw on the exemplary 
findings of two configurative moments. 
2.  Stressing Comparison 
A major challenge for the comparative approach stressed in this article is to not 
assimilate the installation and robotic hand into existing categories. This im-
plies breaking somewhat with traditional comparisons found in innovation 
studies, which compare factors that cause or favour innovations and determine 
whether these are specific to innovation systems, communities, or niches (i.e. 
Nelson 1993; Rogers 2003). Such comparisons are commonly based on ex-post 
rationalisations of innovation paths and might not account for unpredictable 
situations through which novelty is enacted.4 Furthermore, stressing novelty 
and its multiple configurations through different materialities seems to require 
moving beyond comparison as presently discussed in qualitative research. A 
                                                             
3  My approach is informed by but not like Strathern’s analogical comparison. In the main 
body of her work, she compares cases that need to be understood through those she has 
explored more, based on analogies, whereas I investigate and compare the installation and 
the robotic hand in parallel. 
4  This argument entails actors, who may retrospectively rationalise their behaviour, just as it 
entails research perspectives that favour rationalities, which fit innovation models.  
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major concern of textbooks teaching qualitative comparison is how to move 
from single case studies towards typologies (cf. Kelle and Kluge 2010; Rohlf-
ing 2009). Their solutions (and “rules” (Kelle and Kluge 2010, 108-13)) stress, 
for instance, considering case selection and sampling so as to foster variance 
and similarity in data sets and to cope with the complexity of collected infor-
mation. In this regard, investigating innovation and novelty in material practice 
encourages the rearrangement of some elements of qualitative comparison. In 
material practice, complexity is less a methodological problem than a constitutive 
condition for objects to exist as novelty. John Law stresses that events and pro-
cesses are not simply complex in the sense that they are technically difficult to 
grasp, but rather that they “necessarily exceed our capacity to know them” (Law 
2004, 6, author’s emphasis).5 This entails the often peculiar, opaque, nebulous, 
and mystified ways through which technological objects are brought into being 
(cf. Rheinberger 1992; Pickering 1995; Haraway 1997; Suchman 2007). Hence, 
considering complexity stresses the entanglement of heterogeneous material, 
semantic, and bodily agencies. Furthermore, there might be no precise vocabulary 
of novelty that marks a situation or case as a relevant sample. This lack of vo-
cabulary is twofold: first, it becomes semantically apparent as neither “novelty” 
nor “innovation” is necessarily a relevant label within an object’s location. 
Second, it becomes apparent in theoretically accounting for the pragmatics 
through which novelty emerges. These pragmatics might not follow established 
categories of innovation genesis, but instead appear in various situations, the 
significance of which is only seen through comparing real-time observations. 
Hence, I see investigating novelty as an opportunity to reconfigure compari-
son as a device for asking how an object becomes different to others and why 
there is alteration and continuity across cases. For this endeavour, I draw on 
ethnographic methods that open a symmetrical perspective on human and mate-
rial agencies and which account for complexity and contingency of situations. 
However, as already stated, in order to identify abstract processes across cases 
and fields, one needs to go beyond thick descriptions and compare. This re-
quirement entails the aforementioned methodological paradox: On the one 
hand, STS and ethnography usually argue that contexts exhibit different and 
incommensurable traits, whereas, on the other hand, comparison involves the 
investigation of discrete contexts to elucidate their similarities and differences 
(cf. Jensen et al. 2011; Niewöhner and Scheffer 2010; Morita 2014). I want to 
break down this paradox into three entangled issues.  
The first issue regards the construction of comparability as an explicit part 
of the research process. Strathern stresses that comparability is not intrinsic to 
                                                             
5  Law’s argument can be found in different forms among several sources cited in this article. For 
instance, Marilyn Strathern speaks of the “unpredictability” of initial conditions (Strathern 
1999, 5), or Joachim Matthes claims that believing in the universality of sociological terms is 
“Realitätsausblendung” (“blinding out reality,” own translation) (Matthes 1992, 94). 
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anything, but is created through the perceptual tools of the researcher that relate 
phenomena (Strathern 1991). Objects of comparison are not found “out there” 
as predetermined units, but are produced through contextualisation, including 
analytical and cross-contextual framings that foster the production of meaning 
and inductive theory building (Niewöhner and Scheffer 2010). This includes 
re-arranging situations across different sites over the course of investigation in 
order to evoke comparability (Sørensen 2010). Objects of comparison are then 
a matter of inductive reasoning that is open for new experiences that may shift 
foci and research questions. The main issue stressed through the paradox is 
how research objects are made comparable, without assimilating empirical 
phenomena into deductive categories or giving up ethnographic trademarks like 
the specificity of location. 
These remarks already indicate that a researcher’s perspective is deeply entan-
gled with how comparability is produced. This second issue stresses decisions 
that create conditions and consequences of difference and sameness (Matthes 
1992; Strathern 1991; Jensen et al. 2011). Drawing a connection between practic-
es and their configurations is made possible by concepts articulated from the 
researcher’s point of view. Joachim Matthes stresses the implications of this view 
and its consequences for using comparison as method. As an example, he refers 
to “small family” as an indicator for progressing modernisation. The discovery of 
this in non-Western societies might show the universal character of the sociologi-
cal term, but this is not to be understood as comparison. Searched and found 
methods neglect social realities in which phenomena grow. This is a false episte-
mology that stems from a lack of reflexivity in terms of a sociological concept’s 
origin. Matthes stresses that sociological comparison should rather be understood 
as what it is: a cultural operation in which the experience of alteration is faced 
(Matthes 1992, 94). He proposes stepping back and asking what constitutes the 
experience of sameness and difference. This includes addressing the subjectivity 
of comparison and one’s own socialisation within a specific research context, 
which biases the identification of specific continuities. In my case, this is the STS 
perspective, which guides my view on configurations and relates what I see in the 
field with concepts that I know from reading a specific kind of literature. 
The third issue concerning comparison is not sufficiently addressed within 
methodological literature. It is one’s own bodily involvement within situations. 
As I show in the following empirical section, my bodily presence in the artist’s 
studio and the robotics lab actively co-produced the situation through which 
both objects were enacted as novel. The bodily engagement of the researcher is 
not only black-boxed in traditional forms of qualitative comparison since data 
formats like interview transcripts erase the physical context of the interview, 
but also in ethnographic comparison, which commonly treats what is observed 
as if it would have happened the same way independent of the presence of the 
ethnographer. I would like to propose an alternative to silencing the witness 
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and implicate my own engagement in the field by considering my bodily agen-
cy as physically co-producing what is compared. 
3.  Two Configurative Moments 
Considering the following comparison as configurative moments refers to what 
Strathern called an “ethnographic moment” (Strathern 1999, 3). By using this 
term, she describes the relationship between what is observed in the ethno-
graphic field and what is to be understood at the moment of analysis. The eth-
nographic moment is a relationship between what is apprehended and what 
seems to demand apprehension – between observing and understanding. It 
highlights the dual relationship of the researcher with his or her field. The 
researcher is immersed in the field and becomes part of the observed activities, 
just the same as the analysis entails spatial and intellectual movement away 
from the field (Strathern 1999, 9). Thus, the following moments are not to be 
understood as empirical incidents; they are rather the relation between what I 
want to understand about novelty and what I observed in the artist’s studio and 
the robotics laboratory. 
I.  Rendering Imagined Objects 
The first moment delineates the rendering of objects. The installation and the 
robotic hand are not concrete yet in this moment, but only partly materialised in 
sketches, experimental set-ups, and prototypes, as well as communicated through 
the semiotics of images and theories. The two empirical incidents sketched in the 
following were video-recorded in the artist’s studio as well as in the robotics 
laboratory.6 The first sequence is an excerpt of a participatory observation, 
whereas the second was scheduled as an appointment for an interview.  
  
                                                             
6  The analysis of the video recordings has been methodologically informed, in particular, by 
Charles Goodwin’s sequential interpretations (Goodwin 2000), Hubert Knoblauch’s focused 
ethnography (Knoblauch 2001) and Lorenza Mondada’s focus on multiple temporalities that 
conflate in material practice (Mondada 2012). Charles Goodwin’s studies also point out 
ways to compare small-scale interactions. For instance, he compares interactional patterns 
in sequences of young girls playing hopscotch with archaeologists classifying colour. 
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Figure 1: Video Sequence Recorded in the Artist’s Studio 
No. Time Still of the Video Transcript 
I. 02:35 
 
A: “When you attach this one 
here, then it moves… 
[points to the pulley] 
The idea is now, if you build in 
an elastic element somewhere, 
or an extra noose, so when I 
make the movement here, it 
arrives over there three seconds 
later, as a kind of delay. 
II. 03:06 
 
And then you have a kind of 
line, which propagates through 
it. 
[makes a snake movement with 
his hand] 
I would additionally hang that 
separate. 
[orientates his gaze and hands 
towards the wooden panels] 
… so this is hard. 
III. 03:35 
 
Imagine this was there in every 
row, like four, five times, then I 
would replace this hanger with 
that. 
[makes a bow movement with 
his hand] 
[…] So the whole system is hung 
in two dimensions, totally 
detached, actually totally 
sprung. And then only at every 
entrance does a signal enter. 
[points to the end of the wood-
en structure, orientates towards 
JS]
IV. 04:10 
 
And you actually have a wafting 
area. You have a wafting area 
through which this is wandering 
through slowly. The best is a 
closed circuit that is only trig-
gered once… [4s] I always had 
something like a landscape 
situation in mind.” 
[continues to pull the string 
through the eyelets] 
 
The first sequence shows the artist and me during my observation of his mun-
dane creative practice. He explains to me how and why he is building a test 
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structure for an installation. The structure is made out of two wooden plates, 
hooks, threaded bars, strings, nuts, and bolts, as well as customised pulleys. In 
the stills of the video sequence (Figure 1), the test structure is in front of the 
artist (in a black t-shirt) and me on his workbench. The sequence begins with 
him explaining the workings of the test structure. First, he points to the ele-
ments that are already in place. He signifies these by referring to “a kind of 
delay” that is supposed to evolve through a specific ordering of strings, pulleys, 
and an elastic element. In the second frame, he starts to refer to the anticipated 
aesthetics, which are supposed to evolve through a kind of movement that 
appears to propagate through the structure. By moving his arm like a snake, he 
mimics what kind of behaviour he would like to achieve. He emphasises that 
this is a challenge. In the following frame, he relies on my ability to imagine 
what he has in mind. He expects me to imagine how he will continue to build 
the test structure in order to figure out if he is able to establish the propagating 
movement within a closed circuit (Frame III). Furthermore, I should also grasp 
the image that he has in mind. The first image is a “wafting area” – an image 
close to the movement of the strings, which lie partly assembled in front of us. 
The second image is “a landscape situation” that he has had in mind as an 
initial idea for the installation. 
Shortly after my visit to the studio, I had an appointment for an initial inter-
view with the robotics scientist in the lab that he works in. In contrast to the 
first sequence, which took place in a mundane setting, this appointment was 
framed as an interview. The sequence shows the scientist and me talking about 
what his project, the silicon hand, is about (Figure 2). We are sitting at a table 
with the first prototype of the hand. The hand is connected to an air compressor 
and a computer, so that its basic grasping function can be demonstrated. The 
scientist opens the conversation by explaining the basic advantage of a robotic 
hand made out of silicon, which he sees in the low signal processing needed for 
enabling complex grasping. He points out that this is not the typical case in 
robotics, which is still dominated by hands operated by electric motors. A 
crucial difference between his hand and others is the “many interactive things” 
that happen in relation to the environment. He enacts this in Frame II, in which 
he demonstrates the hand’s softness by easily spreading its fingers with his finger-
tips and placing an artificial apple into it in order to show its ability to adapt to its 
environment. After this practical task, he continues in Frame III by explaining the 
more abstract principle behind it. His and his colleagues’ idea is to “create another 
kind of communication” for a robotic hand, as opposed to steering it. In the last 
frame, the pragmatics of this “communication” are again emphasised by referring 
to the importance of the contact surface for a good grasp. The fact that this 
“does not always work” highlights the exploratory character of their novel 
approach to grasping.  
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Figure 2: Video Sequence Recorded in the Robotics Laboratory 
No. Time Still of the Video Transcript 
I. 00:55 
 
S: “That is how the actua-
tors work. The advantage is 
that you only need one 
signal: inflating, releasing. 
This is something that is 
usually not done in robot-
ics. Usually, grasping is 
done in a very linear rela-
tion. Typically, electric 
motors have very good 
characteristics. With these 
rubbers, many interactive 
things happen with the 
environment. When I now… 
[presses some keys; the 
silicon hand coils up] 
II. 01:45 
 
[positions his spread 
fingers between the finger 
tips and palm of the silicon 
hand] 
It is soft. 
[puts an artificial apple 
into the silicon hand] 
When something gets into 
the hand, its form adapts to 
it. 
III. 01:56 
 
[mimics a round form with 
his hand; the apple rolls 
out of the silicon hand] 
This is exactly what we 
want to make use of here. 
That the hand… that it is 
not steered where the 
fingers have to be or how 
much pressure or power has 
to be applied. But we create 
another kind of communi-
cation of the hand.
IV. 02:24 
 
[takes the apple in his 
hand, waves it, and puts it 
back onto the box] 
And we just try to establish 
as much surface for contact 
as possible. The more 
contact surface you have, 
the better it grasps. Surely, 
it does not always work, but 
this is the basic principle, 
that we have as much 
contact surface as possible.” 
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Transcribing both scenes is already a step toward producing comparability (cf. 
the first issue stressed in Section 2). It allows the contextualization of situations 
in a new way and relating previously disparate events. However, it is also se-
lective and technically navigates the analysis. By juxtaposing the transcripts, a 
similarity in both situations comes to the foreground, which is the unfinished 
state of the objects. This is of little surprise, because the not-readiness of both 
projects was a sampling criterion. Interesting, rather, is that both actors do not 
consider the materials that lie in front of them as preliminaries. It is unclear if the 
material elements that lie in front of the artist, the scientist, and me will be devel-
oped further. However, juxtaposing transcripts does not go much beyond thick 
description and cannot relate the similarity to the enactment of novelty. To do so 
and to signify the similarity of the uncertain states further, I introduce a new, 
more provocative question that is reasonable in the new contextualisation; I ask: 
What are the enacted objects actually? This question is not arbitrary, but influ-
enced by my own socialisation and reading of a specific kind of literature (cf. the 
second issue). It is influenced by Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s term “epistemic 
things,” which captures the changing statuses of objects in experimental systems 
(Rheinberger 1992). An epistemic thing is not defined by a specific material state, 
but rather through its position “at the centre of the investigative effort” (Rhein-
berger 1992, 310). It is characterised by an irreducible vagueness as “it trans-
lates the fact that one does not exactly know what one is looking for” and “is 
yet in the process of becoming materially defined” (Rheinberger 1992, 310). 
Similarly, the structure that lies in front of the artist and me in Figure I is part 
of the “wafting area’s” material becoming. The wooden plates, hooks, strings, 
and pulleys are not the locus of his investigation; they are rather the experi-
mental system through which he partly materialises the image he has in mind. 
Likewise, the prototypical silicon hand in Figure II is not the scientific object 
under investigation. The scientist emphasises in his story that he and his col-
leagues research the abstract principles of grasping, which he refers to as “an-
other kind of communication” – the basic principle of the hand’s functioning. 
In this way, the silicon hand materialises the exploration of these principles. In 
particular, the assemblage of an air compressor, computer, and artificial apple 
is used to give shape to the hand’s scientific principle – the assemblage renders 
the object’s agency. 
Despite the similarities to Rheinberger’s epistemic things, both situations 
further stress consideration of the objects’ enactments as framed through inter-
action. Although the sampling of both sequences considers them as framed 
differently – the first as a participatory observation and the second as an inter-
view – the use of video recordings shifts the focus to framings through specific 
interactions taking place within the situations (cf. Goodwin 1994). The simul-
taneous re-encountering of the situated entanglements of technical apparatuses, 
accompanying stories and bodily movements enabled through the video, allows 
me to re-frame both situations as demonstrations. In particular, the stills of the 
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video recordings capture distinct bodily activities of these interactional fram-
ings. First, there are pointing gestures. They accompany explanations and indi-
cate what the artist and the scientist are referring to when they talk (cf. Good-
win 2000). In the first sequence, for instance, these pointing gestures select 
those parts of the structure that are described as crucial for establishing the 
anticipated movement. Secondly, there are gestures that mimic and physically 
enact the future object. This bodily simulation is a distinctive form of enacting 
epistemic objects that have not yet materialised, but are referenced in commu-
nicative situations. Natasha Myers calls such body-work “embodied imagina-
tion” (Myers 2008, 165). In her study on protein modelling, she argued that 
material and mental models are not to be regarded as dualistic, but rather as 
deeply entwined. Through embodied imagination, researchers incorporate the 
inner structure of models and enact these as epistemic objects. They use their 
bodies to make graphical objects tangible, and they employ gestures and 
movements in communication with novices in order to flesh out and relay their 
knowledge about otherwise only virtual objects (Myers 2008, 180). In both 
sequences, I am such a novice. The snake movement in the first sequence 
(Frame II) gives body to the not-yet-realised aesthetics of the future installa-
tion. Its materialisation might still be far away, but the image of “a kind of line, 
which propagates through it” already structures the situation at hand. In a simi-
lar but not equal way, the scientist makes use of his body in the second se-
quence. He uses his body not precisely to mimic the hand, but to enact the 
distinctive difference of his silicon hand against how he expects me to think 
robot hands typically work. In order to do so, he demonstrates the softness of 
the silicon hand by easily spreading its fingers with his. He does so without 
force or additional programming, so I can comprehend the hand’s compliance. 
This compliance is a basic principle of the hand’s distinctive kind of grasping 
and is referenced through bodily movements. Both situations are co-produced 
by my bodily presence, which is reflected in the specific gestures the artist and 
the scientist use to enact their objects (cf. the third issue). I cannot tell whether 
they would have acted similarly toward somebody else (probably yes), but 
what the sequences crucially indicate is the need to consider one’s bodily in-
volvement in co-producing the situations that are being compared.  
Through the comparative analysis of both sequences and the successive fo-
cus on single aspects in accordance with studies and concepts found in litera-
ture, I can go beyond describing similarities and articulate processes of general 
significance for the emergence of novelty within material practice. This is how 
bodily enactments render future objects’ agencies, which are partly material-
ised, partly imagined. The configurative moment through which I delineate the 
continuities of both situations is rendering imagined objects and can be sum-
marised as situated enactments of imagined objects’ agencies through material 
assemblages, bodily movements, and accompanying stories. 
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II.   Material Referencing 
In the introduction of this article, I adopt an understanding of novelty, which 
regards referencing as elementary to novelty instead of an intrinsic quality of 
objects. The transcripts of Figures I and II already indicate that referencing is not 
only a narrative practice. Certainly, the narratives of the artist and the scientist 
reference either their own work or their field, but the materials used seem to carry 
additional semiotics. These material semiotics are delineated through the second 
moment of material referencing, for which I analyse two situations similar to 
those mentioned above, as well as some brief observations that I made during an 
exhibition and at a conference.7 
The first situation is an excerpt from a conversation with the artist that took 
place in his studio a few days prior to the one transcribed above. We talked 
about an already finished and exhibited piece of his. For that particular piece, 
he worked with wooden staffs, strings, plumb weights, and small electric mo-
tors that were digitally programmed. All these elements are similar to those 
used for the test structure mentioned in Figure I. In contrast to the rather small 
test set-up, the components of the installation form a large structure, approxi-
mately two meters in both height and diameter. The wooden staffs serve as a 
frame that holds together a complex, three-dimensional mesh of strings. Through 
the plumb weights and pre-programmed motors, the mesh moves in such a way 
that the spectator cannot exactly tell what causes the deformation or where the 
strings move next. At an exhibition of the piece, I witnessed how visitors engaged 
with it. Most people changed their perspective several times: first, they looked at 
the frame and the tautened mesh from a distance, capturing the piece as a whole 
as they simultaneously watched the mesh’s movements and the overall con-
struction. Afterwards, they moved closer and looked at single mechanical ele-
ments and how one string with a plumb weight was reacting to the pull of a mo-
tor. As I watched the visitors from a bench beside the installation, it occurred to 
me as obvious that the installation’s aesthetic effect was materialised through the 
opaque complexity of its technical assemblage. People were attracted by the 
duality of seeing simple materials move, but not being able to ascribe what exact-
ly caused specific deformations. Besides its aesthetic effects, the material also 
carries specific semiotics. The artist recounts that his intent to use wood as the 
main material was purely pragmatic in the beginning. It was cheap and easy to 
work with. Later on, he explains, he became aware of the fact that the assemblage 
of wooden parts, strings, and plumb weights is a reference to mechanical tech-
nologies of the 17th and 18th centuries. This reference, which was not intended 
by him during the initial conceptualisation of the work, was re-produced through 
an invitation to install the piece in another exhibition that was celebrating the 
                                                             
7  The observations are documented in field notes, video recordings, and pictures. Additionally, 
discursive materials like exhibition flyers and conference contributions inform my literacies.  
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foundations of modern science. Similar to the wood used in that piece, he used 
fibreglass for another installation, mainly because he could process it easily. 
Additionally, he says, fibreglass brings along the aesthetics of a scientific ex-
periment, which is an important analogy for his art. Such material references 
indicate the figures of his artworks, which are mainly drawn from forgotten 
scientific technologies. 
In a similar way, material references are indicated by the scientist in Figure 
II. He states that the usage of silicon for robotic grasping in their approach 
differentiates their hand from others in the field. He emphasises that the field is 
still dominated by hands with electronic motors. Thus, using silicon is an ex-
ploratory endeavour, which surely “does not always work.” Nevertheless, sili-
con not only structures his work as resistance, but also opens up opportunities. 
On the one hand, by using silicon, he and his research group are able to con-
tribute to the rather young field of soft robotics, which attracts robotics that 
make use of soft and deformable structures. The field has its own conferences 
and research network and is characterised by robotic objects whose shape and 
functioning are inspired by biology. Thus, the use of silicon works like an 
admission to a new field. On the other hand, silicon is a material that is distinc-
tively different from those typically used in the field of robotic grasping, which 
is an already established field. This difference encouraged the scientist to bring 
single fingers from the hand to a grasping conference and pass them around the 
audience. The attendees were able to touch and inflate these detached fingers 
and try out the ways in which they bent. During the scientist’s presentation, I 
was sitting in the audience, too. As the finger and the air pump (which could be 
used to inflate them), were passed along to me, I realised that their basic func-
tioning could be demonstrated rather easily. Everybody was able to make the 
finger deform and simulate a grasp. This interactive presentation materially 
referenced the concepts that were mentioned in his talk, and also indicated in 
the interview above. 
The preceding two paragraphs are narratives for which I assembled and re-
arranged different kinds of observations. Both focus on the public enactments 
of materials used by the artist and the scientist for their respective objects. They 
are already guided by my theoretical intentions and do not consist of orthodox 
ethnographies. Nonetheless, assembling pieces of observations is reasonable 
for constructing comparability, as it makes my material accessible for the con-
ceptual question I have concerning the relation of material practice and novelty 
(cf. the first issue). Still, my doing needs to be explicated, since the experience 
of similarity and difference is partly constituted through the new narratives. In 
that sense, they guide my perspective and comparative practice (cf. the second 
issue). My bodily presence is inscribed into the narratives. However, whereas 
my presence co-produced the situations in the first moment, I seem to have less 
agency here – rather, I am immersed in the public space of the exhibition and 
the conference, without causing a response that specifically addresses me. My 
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role within the situations is to take part as a participant, as one of the many who 
are addressed by the exhibition and talk. I can only take on this role through my 
bodily involvement: I can have a seat on the bench and watch people engaging 
with the artwork, and I am the person to whom the silicon finger is passed next. 
Most of the events would have happened the same way without me, but the 
elements of the events that I am comparing were produced through my physical 
encounters (cf. the third issue).  
One similarity that I see in the narratives is that the materials are not merely 
instrumental, nor are they naive substrates that carry inscription without com-
mentary (cf. Rammert 1999); the wood became not only a pragmatic choice 
just as the silicon of the hand is not only conceptual. Rather, the entanglement 
of semiotics and material is significant in both narratives. This correspondence 
of public space and materiality, which is so far only an empirical continuity 
constructed through my re-arrangements, might be better understood in analogy 
to what Strathern called the “aesthetics of substance” (Strathern 1999, 45). 
Based on her material collected in Papua New Guinea, she differentiated be-
tween inside and outside bodies. She draws on Etoro witch-children, who be-
came victims of ritual homicide as newborns for having the “fat” body that pre-
sumably indicated the child’s demonic possession. The bodily condition of the 
child became a presentation or shadow of the primary inner condition of the 
body, which was regarded as occupied by a witch’s greed that made it swell. The 
visible outside body was an image of such hidden agencies. It had an aesthetic 
effect as it communicated the condition to others (Strathern 1999, 50). In a simi-
lar way, the objects analysed here are configured as outsides of their agencies. 
Read through Strathern’s conceptualisation of ritually enacted bodies, the aesthet-
ics of the artist’s installation are an image of its inner agencies. Strings, plumb 
weights, and motors are a technological assemblage that is not perceived through 
its functionality, but its presence. The elements working-together is hidden and 
only aesthetically referenced through the installations outside body. The installa-
tion is a shadow of its complex, opaque assemblage. The robotic hand’s silicon 
fingers are enacted in a similar way at the conference. They were passed around 
so the attendees could get an idea of the material’s capacities. These capacities, 
such as the silicon’s compliance and its deformability, were not communicated 
through a power-point presentation alone, but aesthetically referenced through 
sample fingers. The sample fingers were enacted as images because they materi-
alised not the pragmatics of a complete grasp, but the silicon’s hidden capacities.  
However, in both narratives, the objects do not only refer to the insides of 
their bodies, but further evoke images beyond the immediate context. They 
evoke images in the sense that their materialities open opportunities for new 
relations. In a similar way, Sherry Turkle speaks of “evocative objects” as “things 
we think with” (Turkle 2007). In her examples, objects take on roles in which 
they unfold a reflexive, evocative efficacy. Evocative objects enable people to 
discover new perspectives and orderings of their life world. Especially objects 
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that do not assimilate into established categories challenge us to search for new 
relations (Turkle 2007). In such a way, references evoked through the combina-
tion of wooden staffs, strings, and digitally programmed electric motors re-
negotiate images of technological objects. The artist’s installation carries the 
semiotics of ancient apparatuses, just as its mechanics are governed by the micro-
technologies of the digital age. Similarly, the softness of the scientist’s silicon 
hand articulates the difference of his approach in opposition to others. It is bend-
able and compliant, and it interactively responds to its environment by defor-
mation, as opposed to robotic hands made out of solid material, which need to be 
precisely programmed in order to grasp. The silicon’s specific agency signifies 
the hand as distinctively different from the established categories of its field. The 
robotic hand, just as the media installation, not only materialises the present state 
of what is, but must be regarded as an agent within its own construction as nov-
elty, as its material evokes thoughts of what could be. 
The continuity in both objects’ public enactments is their distinctive materi-
al referencing. Material referencing is the situated enactment of materialities as 
an image of an object’s hidden capacities. Through this moment, the objects are 
channelled into discourses and technological tales that equally signify their 
material constitution. Delineating this continuity is not to say that the practices 
and intentions of the actors equal. The installation’s referencing was produced 
through opacity, whereas the silicon hand’s referencing was concerned with 
reducing it. However, despite their different articulation, the hidden quality of 
capacities and the enactment of both objects as images of these remain as ab-
stract continuities that are significant for how novelty is publicly enacted. 
4.  Reconfiguring Comparison 
To begin this reconfiguration, I briefly discuss the two configurative moments 
regarding the research question of how novelty is enacted through materialities, 
stories, and bodies. From there, I re-articulate the three issues that I have 
stressed concerning comparison. To close this paper, I make two remarks on 
methods of innovation studies and reflexivity, which are central concerns of 
this HSR Special Issue. 
“Novelty” 
I mention in the beginning that, from a configurative perspective, novelty is not 
a property, but an articulation that calls out differences to whatever is refer-
enced as the thing that came before. This perspective, which refuses to mark 
novelty as a universal good, is akin to other remarks on novelty found in social 
theory. From a different theoretical angle, Hubert Knoblauch reads two sources 
of novelty in Alfred Schütz’s theory of action (Knoblauch 2011, 101): The first 
source is fantasy, which he sees as the subjective precondition for the culturally 
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influenced and communicated imaginary. The second source is comprised of 
situated actions and creativity through which situations are (re)configured (cf. 
Joas 1992; Rammert 1999). Both elements entail difference between what is 
typically expected and what actually happens. On the one hand, difference is 
enacted as the imaginary that is shared through the semiotics of narratives and 
stories; on the other hand, it is enacted through the creative re-organisation of a 
situation, which entails the pragmatic assemblage of material elements.  
Read in light of the two configurative moments, novelty emerged through 
the joining of both elements. It is configured by relating the imaginary and 
material and by enacting stories and artefacts as different to what is expected or 
given. In the first moment, the test structure and the hand prototype were partly 
materialised objects that were signified through their relation to the landscape 
image and theories about grasping. These imaginaries were articulated as the 
difference between what had materialised so far and what was about to be-
come. In the second moment, the mechanics of the media installation – just as 
the silicon of the hand – referenced what came before. The media installation 
enacted the semiotics of ancient apparatuses as an aesthetic tension in contrast 
to the mesh’s contingent and non-functional behaviour. Similarly, the hand’s 
silicon referenced its conceptual difference to expected approaches in robotics. 
All those articulations that rendered the compositions and bounds of the objects 
were enacted through spatial and temporal configurations of difference.  
However, just as I am able to delineate continuities regarding the media in-
stallation, the robotic hand, and their enactments as novel objects, the articula-
tions of novelty are also considerably diverse in both cases; neither actor 
stresses novelty explicitly. There are concepts like “aesthetics” or “scientific 
progress” that are more akin to the location of their practice than novelty is, 
which does not seem to be a relevant category or label for them. Concepts 
stressed by the actors were, for instance, images like “the wafting area” or the 
“communication of the hand.” “Novelty” is my term and is an attempt to articu-
late continuities between the actors’ concepts. My concept of novelty might 
thus be considerably different to the form articulated in a specific location at a 
certain time. It is, therefore, crucial to ask where attributes are found (Strathern 
1991, 51). Stressing a concept’s location acknowledges not only the institution-
al settings the two objects are a part of, but also the differences in the situations 
of their enactment. For instance, the difference of the robotic hand to its com-
ponents in the field was articulated according to its situational framing, first in 
relation to my (lay) understanding of robotic hands and then in opposition to 
the expectations of the conference attendees. These are considerably different 
articulations of the same object. Hence, delineating novelty in the comparison 
of both cases is an attempt to give image to the experience of sameness, as the 
continuities of the two configurative moments, and difference, in the form of 
their concrete articulation. 
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Comparability, Perspective, and Bodily Involvement 
I begin this article with a quote of Marilyn Strathern. She remarks that reflec-
tions on the form of narration and the otherness of one’s subject matter are also 
reflections on the kinds of connections these concepts make possible (Strathern 
1991, 51). In this vein, I make an attempt to reconfigure the three issues 
stressed earlier regarding comparison.  
The first issue concerns the construction of comparability. Above, I outline 
that objects of comparison are not found “out there” as predetermined units, but 
are produced through the research process. Regarding the construction of com-
parability, Strathern writes that it is the act of comparison that constitutes rela-
tionships, not intrinsic qualities of phenomena. In contrast to common ap-
proaches in innovation studies, the installation and the robotic hand are not 
being compared as already institutionalised objects. It was left to the research 
process whether particular articulations could be delineated that make an object 
identifiable as one of art or science – and, more crucial here, as a novel object. 
Such an approach to comparison does not assimilate two phenomena into a 
deductive category, but draws lines between discrete phenomena in order to 
delineate their sameness and difference, as well as to give image to the continu-
ities that exist across the complexity of situations. In Strathern’s work, continu-
ities are not articulated as questions of homogeneity, but as “proximities in 
space and time” (Strathern 1991, 55). Through changes of perspectives, such 
proximities might appear as variants of some other form found elsewhere. The 
researcher’s concepts and writings form a kind of integrated circuit between 
parts that work as significant continuities that can be delineated as moments 
through which novelty is configured.  
The second issue stressed the perspective from which the comparison is 
made. Matthes urged the consideration of comparison as a cultural operation that 
calls on the researcher to step back and ask what constitutes the experience of 
sameness and difference (Matthes 1992). The experience of alteration is not 
substantive, but relational – including how the researcher relates to what is con-
sidered as different. To articulate her relation to the subject matter, Strathern 
makes use of Donna J. Haraway’s cyborg figure (Strathern 1991, 54). Haraway 
later articulated her own research perspective by figuring a “modest witness” 
(Haraway 1997). Her modest witness is not oppositional to its subject matter, but 
implicated and literate, just as it is suspicious and worried. It is inside the “Net” 
of stories and agencies and simultaneously learns to avoid its narratives and 
realities (Haraway 1997, 3). In this sense, I went beyond the position of a silent 
ethnographer and instead engaged with the actors. I asked about how things 
worked and took part in conversations; I took the liberty of re-arranging obser-
vations and have assembled these into narratives according to my interest in 
novelty; I re-arranged what I saw and entered into dialogue with the literature 
that I am familiar with. This practice has allowed me to go beyond description 
in order to identify the continuities of the two configurative moments. A mod-
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est perspective enacts connections that respond to one’s own agency within just 
as it may render continuities between units to re-join them. This implies one’s 
otherness to a place and equally stresses sameness and how it comes about. 
The third issue addresses the reconfiguration of perspective as a concrete 
and physical matter. My agency within situations does not only matter in terms 
of my intellectual perspective, but also in terms of my bodily involvement. I 
was implicated in the situatedness of practices, which I simultaneously wit-
nessed. The artist and the scientist reacted to my engagement with gestures and 
the rhetorical use of imperatives in their stories (“Imagine, this would be there in 
every row, like four, five times…”). If an object is enacted as new, it is refer-
enced as different in anticipation of my response. I was figured through the situa-
tion, just as my perception figured the subsequent account of what happened. In 
the first moment, my bodily engagement became vivid while the movements of 
the artist and the scientist addressed me personally and enacted the objects ac-
cording to my presence in the studio and lab. I was addressed as a person, where-
as my body was immersed in a crowd in the second moment. Meanwhile, the 
second moment is signified through relating materials, stories, and the public 
space created by bodily presence. A modest witness who is comparing needs to 
consider and use his or her own bodily and intellectual position in the circuits 
of materialities, stories, and bodies that articulate an object. 
The reconfiguration of these three issues addresses the methodological para-
dox of comparison from the STS perspective. This paradox is how to account 
for the situatedness of events while identifying continuities to define abstract 
processes. My strategy for solving this is not to predefine deductive categories, 
but to enhance subjectivity and use one’s own engagement to make visible 
elements that signify how novelty is enacted. By contextualizing what is found 
in one location with what is observed in another and relating these to what is 
already understood concerning a particular question, I identify and name pro-
cesses that are significant and accountable across sites. Reconfiguring compari-
son connects different temporalities of encounters, changing literacies, and the 
flux of questions and contingencies. Its witness is local, as it immerses in the 
net of materialities, stories, and bodies just as it moves on and re-arranges what 
is understood and what needs to be understood. 
Innovation Studies and Reflexivity 
To close this paper, I want to make two remarks on methods of innovation 
studies and reflexivity. What can we learn from this reconfiguration for meth-
ods of innovation studies? My article suggests not an understanding of novelty 
as a preliminary step on a path with innovation at its end, but rather as a con-
cept that connects several steps in innovation cycles: novelty signifies inquiries 
in research and development laboratories just as it legitimises market-ready 
goods as innovations. However, this reconfiguration is simultaneously involved 
and critical. Field semantics like “improvement,” “progress,” or “development” 
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are akin to “innovation” and must be understood as figures of scientific and 
technological discourses that reinforce boundaries. Comparison is the possibil-
ity of reading such concepts diffractively and stressing their isomorphism. 
To entail oneself in a reconfiguration is to acknowledge reflexivity not only 
as a particular mode of innovation found out there in “fields of innovation” 
(Hutter et al. 2015, in this HSR Special Issue), but also as a way of positioning 
oneself within the situations through which novelty is enacted. Our concepts 
figure what we see just as we are figured through the relations we derive. What 
I explore in this paper is the connectedness of my bodily and intellectual dispo-
sition with situated enactments of novelty. Reflexivity in the two configurative 
moments not only concerns the institutional frame of activities in “art” or “sci-
ence,” but also responds to the situatedness of referencing and one’s own locat-
ability in the heterogeneity of semiotics, literacies, and materialities that are 
bent, torn apart, whirled, and re-joined to enact an object as new. Furthermore, 
it has encouraged my motion to re-articulate my questions about novelty and 
how materialities, stories, and bodies in differing locations are connected. 
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